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Abstract 
In the context of globalisation Africa requires investment by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) to improve its competitiveness and to facilitate micro-level structural changes 
required for alleviating poverty and reducing its riskiness for investment. Economic 
theory recognises that MNCs can contribute to economic growth in developing countries 
through generating positive externalities. However, the extent to which Africa benefits 
from spill-over effects of MNCs remains to be empirically investigated. While some 
multinational corporations that operate in Africa take the corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) policies seriously, on the other hand there had been several complaints in many 
African countries on how these French multinational corporations conduct business 
within the continent. Thus, this paper intends to analyse the various paradoxes that are 
surrounding the activities of French multinational companies operating in Africa. 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, MNC, paradox, under development, 
exploitation, conflicts, corruption and environmental degradation  
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Introduction 
Contemporary exigencies due to the end of the Cold War, globalization, the information 
technology revolution and the bifurcation of world politics have all necessitated the 
reevaluation of the business-society relationship and facilitated the emergence of innovative 
business social responsibility practices. The re-invigoration of the idea that business has social 
responsibility that goes beyond profit making to include helping to solve social and 
environmental problems otherwise known as corporate social responsibility  (CSR), has 
provided fertile ground for the debate that has shaped the present direction now assumed by 
business-society relationships. Critics have argued that CSR is a distraction for business in 
meeting its primary goal of profit making, and an inefficient means of allocating scarce 
resources, and that business lacks the legitimacy and competency to take on any such 
responsibility outside its primary area of expertise. In contrast, proponents of CSR have 
responded that the monumental increase in business power, the widespread incidence of 
corporate misdemeanours, issues of ethics and the increasing inability of governments to meet 
their basic responsibility to society, as well as regulate business activities, have meant that the 
acceptance of social responsibility by business has been both inevitable and necessary (Moon: 
2001; 385-408). 
While this debate is far from resolved, emphasis has since shifted from whether 
corporations should imbibe the principles of CSR, to the extent to which CSR principles can 
influence corporate decisions and practices and how business can best address its social 
responsibilities. However, it has been noticed that while some multinational corporations are 
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making an effort to involve stakeholders in their activities, others are using the CSR initiative to 
present an acceptable image to the general public while they remain wolves in sheep skin. This 
attitude is what this paper has termed the paradox of corporate social responsibility. The paper 
opts to lay this paradox bare using the activities of some French MNCs as cases to justify its 
stand. 
At the dawn of the 21st century, characterized by economic globalization, states and 
organizations have tried to adapt to new tendencies to understand the stakes of the challenges. 
The movement of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of these phenomena that call to 
order companies, NGOs and trade unions. In a post-fordist context where the modes of 
regulation have to go beyond national framework, challenges are as well global and the 
question of social and ecological inequalities in the world constitutes one of the bases of 
reflection. It is against this backdrop that this paper is destined to understand the implication of 
French multinational corporations in the corporate social responsibility agenda in Africa. The 
study leans on an investigation carried towards the representatives of some NGOs – that are 
concerned with the actions and activities of MNCs. In addition to profit maximization which is 
the underlying objective of all MNCs, French MNCs equally have as mission to act as promoters 
of Francafrique.  
For more than a century, France was a great colonial state whose economic 
development depended on the exploitation of raw materials and natural wealth that it 
procured cheaply in the territories under her domination (agricultural produce, forestry 
products, oil, minerals etc). The end of the colonial empire in the 1960s did not stop her from 
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conserving a privileged position particularly in Africa by relying on cultural networks, military 
presence, control over the monetary zone (franc CFA) and by maintaining cordial relations with 
local political actors who were equally put in place by France and ready to satisfy the greedy 
and egoistic interests of the former colonial power. 
What was later referred to as Francafrique is an expression that mingled with political, 
economic and commercial interests associated with personal interests that were guided by 
corruption, nepotism, and maladministration( Verchave:1998). Francafrique designed a nebulus 
of economic, political and military actors in France and Africa, organized in networks or lobbies 
polarized on the buying up of two incomes: raw materials and Aid. The logic of this draining is 
to ban initiatives which are out of the circles of the initiated. This self- degrading system which 
recycled itself in criminalization and naturally hostile to democracy was promoted by French 
multinational companies operating in Africa. 
The peculiarity of this system was the overlapping relations between the Government of 
Elysee and Africa on the one hand, and the mangers/directors of French companies implanted 
in Africa at the end of the decolonization process. The legitimacy of this policy and these 
practices that all Elysee Governments have supported since 1960 was presented by the 
necessity to ensure a constant source of energy supply (oil and uranium, etc) in order for France 
to be energy independent. In effect, given that France no longer possessed neither coal, oil nor 
gas in her soil, France was forced to engage in an energy bargain that has been a constant but 
distracted search for the supply of oil through her companies such as Total, Areva and Cogema 
that have free access to the petroleum and mineral resources in her former colonies in Africa. 
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French MNCs have been the principal agents and beneficiaries of the exploitation of 
resources in Africa. Agents in the sense that they have always played a decisive role in the 
putting in place and maintaining some African leaders in power; as beneficiaries because they 
have contributed in plundering the resources of many African countries and they are involved 
in the practice associated to mal-development. The latter does not only involve a social 
dimension but it is also accompanied by given environmental consequences that equally 
constitute one of the characteristics of inequality between the North and the South. 
Deforestation, desertification, impingement on biodiversity, importation of toxic waste, and 
urban pollution can attest to this mal-development. 
Among French companies present in Africa, we have Total, Bouygues et Vinci 
(construction), la compagnie francaise  de l’ Afrique  de l’Ouest (CFAO), Pinault- printemps 
Redonte (PPR) in (distribution), Rougier (forestry),  Veolia  and Suez (water distribution), Accir 
(hotel), Bollore (logistic and transport), Air France, Paribas and Societe Generale among others. 
Submitted to a constant competitive growth from Asian countries (with China taking the lead), 
French postcolonial capitalism that has lived on proceeds made through the exploitation of 
Africa’s resource and its narrow links with the political milieu is in its demise. The 
disengagement is general and new investments are weak: Apart from oil, Africa represents just 
five percent of FDI from France. Total that realised 30% of its global revenue in Africa, does so 
out of former French colonies (Nigeria and Angola). Given that French companies have a 
growing appetite for Africa’s resources, this paper sets out to outline and analyse the activities 
of some French companies in Africa that have help to maintain Africa under the hinges of 
underdevelopment yet preaching good corporate social responsibility. Our case studies include 
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Total, Areva, Suez, Rougier and Bollore which are present in the oil, mining, water distribution, 
timber and agribusiness exploitation sectors respectively. We will use these case studies to 
demonstrate the paradox of CSR by French companies in Africa. To this effect, the paper is 
partitioned as follows: part one deals with the theoretical paradigms associated with CSR. 
Section two analyses the behavior and commitment of French MNCs in Africa while part three 
looks at the implementation CSR by French companies. The last section seeks a way forward to 
the implication of French companies in CSR in Africa.  
Theoretical Interpretations of CSR 
A general internet inquiry of the term corporate social responsibility provides 104 
million results, while the same query in Google Scholar delivers one million and a half entries. 
The highly debated concept of CSR got popularised in the business and management literature 
in the 1950s. Although its embryonic form dates back to the Industrial Revolution( Archie: 
2009;19-46) CSR activities emerged in the USA in the 1920s in the context of a labour defeat 
from corporate executives, who favoured minimal government regulation( Marens:2012; 59-
84). While its home base is in the States, the neoliberal revolution has provided a fertile ground 
for CSR spreading in Europe and other parts of the world( Matten & Moon: 2008; 404-428). 
As Moon (2004) has pointed out, CSR is a difficult concept to pin down. It overlaps with 
other such concepts as corporate citizenship, sustainable business, environmental 
responsibility, the triple bottom line; social and environmental accountability; business ethics 
and corporate accountability. It is highly contextual not only in terms of its corporate 
environment but also in terms of its national environment. Moreover, CSR is an essentially 
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contested concept. Thus any definition will necessarily be challenged by those who wish to 
contest the reach and application of any version of CSR. 
Within the literature there exists three discernible ‘schools’ of thought and practice 
about corporate social responsibility. These schools may be characterised as the neoliberal, 
neo-Keynesian, and radical political economy approaches.In defining CSR, neoliberal writers 
tend to see it fundamentally as the adoption of a set of voluntary policies, codes or guidelines, 
initiated and driven by the corporation. For example, the Australian Treasury, in a submission to 
the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry on CSR, defined CSR as ‘a company’s management of the 
economic, social and environmental impacts of its activities’ ( Australian Government: 2006). 
The neoliberal discourse around CSR generally shares the view articulated by Milton 
Friedman in the New York Times on September 13, 1970: “… there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud”(New York Times: 1970). 
Much of the discourse about CSR in business and management publications shares this 
assumption. For example, the neoliberal journalist Albrechtsen writing in an Opinion piece for 
the Australian newspaper wrote: 
 
The fundamental flaw with corporate social responsibility, and why it is a backward 
step, is the underlying premise that capitalism and companies have something to be 
embarrassed about, that they must justify their existence by going in search of some 
higher moral purpose. …This shame-faced capitalism is an unfortunate development. 
The idea pushed by advocates that the pursuit of private profit is inconsistent with 
public good does not stack up. … How quickly we forget that Adam Smith knew a thing 
or two about human nature ... Smith pointed out that “it is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own self-interest”(Albrechtsen: 2006). 
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However, while this perspective leads some neoliberal commentators to the view that 
CSR is basically an unreasonable intrusion into and restriction on business’ primary purpose, 
most neoliberal adherents who engage in CSR discourse take the view that, while Friedman was 
basically correct, the adoption of CSR policies by companies can be rational and profitable in 
the long run. Furthermore, even if doubt exists about the positive role of CSR in profit-making, 
it can be seen as an important insurance strategy to minimise risks from negative government 
intervention, adverse media coverage and consumer or stockholder backlash to corporate 
behaviour. However, even here, the neoliberal assumption is that CSR is a minor component of 
corporate strategy at best. 
Neo-Keynesian approaches tend to utilise a wider definition that more clearly 
recognises the active role of the corporation’s ‘stakeholders’, and perhaps also the state, in the 
definition of what is corporate social responsibility. Again, however, CSR is generally defined as 
an approach adopted voluntarily by corporations and without external regulation by either 
stakeholders or the state. For example, the European Union’s (EU) Green Paper Promoting a 
European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (2001) described corporate social 
responsibility as concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. 
The Certified General Accountants’ Association of Canada paper, Measuring Up: A Study on 
Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Canada (2005) describes CSR as ‘a company’s 
commitment to operating in an economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable 
manner, while recognising the interests of its stakeholders, including investors, customers, 
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employees, business partners, local communities, the environment, and society at 
large’(Association of Canada: 2005). 
Neo-Keynesian discourse around CSR differs from the neoliberal perspective in several 
important ways. Firstly, there is recognition that corporate behaviour can at times have 
negative impacts whether through market failure, corporate lack of awareness or deliberate 
strategy. These concerns are reflected in neo-Keynesian CSR discourse around the impact of 
corporations’ environmental policies, workplace practices and the social and economic 
consequences of corporate activities. Consequently neo-Keynesian analyses focus on quite 
different reasons for the development of CSR strategies including avoiding problems caused by 
unfettered corporate behaviours, ensuring environmental and social sustainability and 
achieving other desirable social and economic goals. Furthermore, neo-Keynesian analyses and 
discussions of CSR are frequently more inclined to entertain the idea of a positive role for the 
state in the development and regulation of CSR practice. 
Radical political economy approaches take a far more critical stance around CSR on 
several issues. All ‘schools’ of thought in these debates of course possess normative views 
about the role of business in general and corporations in particular in society. However, radical 
political economy analyses more openly articulate a very different set of assumptions about the 
existence and abuse of corporate power in global, national and local economies. Global 
corporations are seen as possessing enormous power which is often wielded ruthlessly in their 
own self-interest and frequently at the expense of society and the environment. Advocates of 
voluntary CSR are perceived as lacking a critical political economy analysis and therefore fail to 
fully understand and incorporate a realistic view of the power structures that exist in society 
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and its economic environment. Hence many of the policies and practices that have been 
developed to promote CSR are viewed as naïve, ineffectual and inadequate. Furthermore, 
radical political analysts not only are sceptical about the effectiveness of CSR programs but are 
also concerned that self-regulatory and voluntary CSR policies are frequently deliberately 
designed by corporations to deflect attention away from external regulation and control of 
corporate behavior and power and to disguise and legitimate other activities that are socially 
and environmentally destructive. 
Many activist groups, and others who adopt a radical critique of CSR approaches, openly 
reject voluntary CSR and advocate an alternative strategy that is generally described as 
‘corporate accountability’. For example, in its submission to the Australian Joint Parliamentary 
Inquiry on CSR, The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) uses the term ‘corporate 
accountability’ to mean ‘holding corporations accountable and responsible for the social and 
environment impacts of their decisions and practices. This includes the impacts, both direct and 
indirect, on human rights, labour rights, the broader community and the environment 
(Australian Government: 2006).  
Having looked the various opinions held by the different schools, this paper subscribes 
to the radical political economy school to demonstrate that though many French multinational 
corporations considered themselves as good corporate citizens the facts and evidences on the 
ground prove the contrary. To support its argument, the paper focuses on the corporate social 
irresponsible behaviours of some French MNCs in Africa. 
Implication of French MNCs in CSR in Africa 
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In the economic milieu, the interest of French MNCs for the CSR agenda is manifested at 
two levels: level of national chambers and the level of individual firms. A good proportion of big 
French MNCs respect the rules and regulation put in place by the European Union and other 
international organization when it comes to promoting CSR initiative such as CSR Europe and 
the UN Global Pact. CSR occupies a great deal of their communication unit and an immense 
effort is made towards  presenting  themselves as responsible enterprises and are proud of 
their merit when it comes to sustainable development. Beyond social and environmental 
reports, TV adverts and internet ads, the particular attention of CSR initiative put in place in 
social and environmental issues by French MNCs is very glaring. However, there is a 
considerable distance between the rhetoric and reality by these companies, the pragmatic 
principles demonstrated on the ground by these companies and poor practices of these MNCs 
in developing countries general and Sub Saharan Africa in particular. This distance is mostly 
manifested by French companies operating within the extractive, forestry, agribusiness and 
water distribution industries in Africa as we are going to discuss below. 
For many years, pioneering French companies came together to act in favour of 
environmental protection in the framework of associations like Oree and “Entreprise pour 
l’environnement or acting in concert with local communities through the implementation of the 
Action 21( Palpacuer: 2006; 45-61). This was the case of the Committee 21 established in 1995 
whose purpose was to assist its members (businesses and local authorities) in the 
implementation of sustainable development and mobilization of the commitments made. 
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In January 2004, some 15 companies signed the UN Global pact. The then French 
president, Jacques Chirac, having noticed that this was manifestly insufficient, he invited 
companies to sign it. A good number of the companies signed the pact but were unable to 
modify their practices. On the contrary, a number of depositions were proposed and were in 
the course of been experimented in France (Ibid). Against this backdrop, we are going to 
examine how French MNCs operating in Africa implemented CSR initiative. 
In this section we will present five case studies that are particularly significant to the 
behavior of French companies in Africa in particular and the developing countries in general. 
The companies under review in this paper include Areva (uranium production) Total (petroleum 
sector) companies in the water distribution sector, Bollore (agribusiness) and Rougier (timber 
exploitation). 
AREVA  
With this company, it is a practice inherited from the colonial past of France, the 
exploitation of raw materials and natural resources from her ex- colonies that is strongly 
questioned(Najim, et al: 2003). In 1957, the mining office of oversees France known as le 
Bureau Minier de la France d’outre- mer found the first traces of uranium in Niger and the 
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique put up a prospecting campaign (Eva & Beccaria: 2004). In 
the context of the cold war at that time, the exploitation of uranium was classified in the 
framework of defense agreements given that uranium exploited and sold to other countries 
could be risky to France, which justified the establishment of an exploitation monopoly of the 
resource.  
K. Awang Ollong 
“The Paradox of Corporate Social Responsibility in Africa: Case of French Multinational Corporations” 
51 
 
In 1968, France created la societe des mines de l’Air (SOMAIR) and the first ton of 
uranium was extracted in 1971( Najim et al: 2003). Engaged in the production of nuclear 
energy, France was in need of this uranium to operate its nuclear plants (a ton of uranium gives 
the energy equivalent of 10,000 tons of oil) (Ibid). In 1969, the exploitation of uranium by 
AREVA (an affiliate of COGEMA, the French organization which manages the nuclear industry), 
was done in return for economic aid to Niger's development. In 1974, Niger called for a 
revaluation of the purchasing price. France refused and staged a military coup which 
established a military regime, whose hierarchy favorable to France, was trained and supervised 
by the French army. Niger was bound to accept the financial condition dictated by Paris and 
AREVA. The former colonial master accepted to increase its official development assistance 
provided Niger invested these resources in agricultural development programmes. But this 
required investments that forced the Nigerien regime to borrow from banks, including the 
World Bank. This eventually helped increase foreign debt (estimated at $ 1.71 billion in 2004) 
(Ibid). As for food sovereignty, Nigerien NGOs believed that it was difficult for the country to 
attain food security as far as this neocolonial policy remained in place. 
Then, the damage of uranium in the health of the population started manifesting: water 
pollution, exposure of workers to radiations, appearance of social problems. The mines of Arlit, 
an open pit and Ahoham underground, are located in a desert zone of the North inhabited by 
Tuaregs. The development of mining activities, the construction of lodging infrastructures and 
the care provided to miners who received high salaries comparatively to the revenue of the 
local population, attracted new inhabitants in search of employment or simply escaping the 
poverty (misery) accentuated by increasing desertification in the zone. Tension between 
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communities, the growth of inactive or unemployed youths, and the advent of prostitution of 
young girls attracted by the wages of the miners has caused tensions that grow by the day 
(Chamaret: 2007). 
The miners created a strong trade union known as National Union of Mine Workers, 
Syntramin (syndicate national de travailleurs des mines). Their demands centred principally on 
wage conditions. They believed that with an increase in the price of uranium, the companies 
had to make an effort by increasing the salaries of miners as it was the case in the 1980s when 
their salaries were reduced due to a decrease in the price of uranium. The syndicates 
acknowledged that the companies had invested much in work safety and that the results were 
satisfactory. However, as a result of the works of French experts transmitted by NGOs such as 
Sherpa, the sanitary impacts of mining activities became an essential preoccupation of the 
population. The harmful effects of uranium were highlighted on the health of the local 
population: two French NGOs noted that water is polluted due to radioactivity, protection 
standards were not respected and workers were exposed to radiations and radioactive gases 
that were spilled all over (Ibid). 
On her part, AREVA took measures whose results were declared “conform to the 
norms” or barely superior to them, but it was reported that AREVA refused all counter 
expertise”. The radio- protection material was insufficient and always out–dated. The two 
hospitals of the town constructed and managed indirectly by the company did not recognize 
occupational diseases caused by uranium whereas the development of cancers, respiratory 
illnesses, and a number of obese children as a result of radioactivity were glaring. 
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Measurements in the streets demonstrated that the ratio of radioactivity was ten times than 
the norms prescribed by the UN. All materials used by the local population were contaminated 
(Verschave; 1998). 
In May 2006, the first street demonstration was organized in the history of mining in 
Niger. Between 8000 and 10,000 people in Arlit demanded the control of uranium by Niger. In 
July 2007, the Nigerien Government withdrew the monopoly of exploitation from AREVA and 
equally increased the price of a kilogramme of uranium paid by AREVA from 42 euro to 61 euro 
till December 2007, before fixing a new price. However, this price was by far below the market 
price of uranium which stood at 192 euro per kilogramme (Chamaret; 2007). In other words, 
Niger had issued 29 prospection contracts of uranium deposit to nine foreign companies. By 
July 2007, consecutive tensions between France and Niger resulted to the expulsion of the local 
director of AREVA, Dominique Pin, accused of sponsoring the Touarag rebels. This decision 
made AREVA, the jewel of Francafrique, the symbol of the end of an era, in a country that 
gained independence since 1960, but considered as one of the poorest countries in the world 
following the classification of UNDP (CRIIRAD; 2005). However, AREVA was not ready to see its 
image rubbed in the mud and was not ready to lose Niger, given that this country produced 
more than 4000 tons of uranium in 2006 and represented more than half of the total 
production of the company. Notwithstanding the traditional demonstration that took place in 
Niger against the activities of AREVA, there were no manifestations against the activities of this 
company in France. This image was carefully polished by the management of “AREVA that for 
example, launched a TV spot across Europe in 2008 to install its new slogan: “AREVA, l’energie 
au sens propre”, literally translated in English as AREVA, “pure energy”. 
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Water Distribution Sector: Saur-Vivendi 
Three French companies are globally involved in the distribution of water in former 
French colonies in Africa.  They are Suez, Veolia and Saur, former subsidiary of Bouygues 
henceforth possessed by Seché (ATTAC France; 2009). These companies have benefitted from 
the general movement of the privatization of water services in many sub-Saharan African 
countries provoked by the staructural adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund. Though the institutional framework about the responsibilities 
of maintenance and investment is imprecise, the central problem remains that of funding and 
financing investments. 
In 1989, the new military government of Guinea Conakry created a new national water 
company known as SONEG (Socièté Nationale des Eaux de Guinée). Private companies were 
invited to bid for a concession agreement for the operation and management of water services 
in 17 urban centres. This bid was attributed to a consortium led by two French companies, Saur 
and Vivendi (transformed to Voelia in 2003), that put in place la Socièté d’Exploitation des Eaux 
de Guinée (SEEG). This company was not only charged with the exploitation and management 
of existing water facilities, but also billing and collection in the 17 urban centres. After a few 
years, the quality of water was ameliorated, the proportion of consumers with functioning 
water meters increased from 5 to 98 percent and those who could not settle their bills simply 
saw their counters disconnected. The price fixed by SEEG increased considerably from 0.12 
dollars (about 100francs CFA) per metre cube in 1989 to 0.83 dollar (about 320francs CFA) in 
1996 (Camara; 2004). 
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Under the pretext that heavy consumers that were mostly government edifices were 
not paying their bills, SEEG stopped depositing the amount owed to the government for rents 
of existing infrastructures. It was against this backdrop that this company saw its turnover 
reach 3.2 billion dollars in 1996 to the satisfaction of the shareholders of this private company 
while that same year SONEG , a state-owned company registered a deficit of 4.1 billion dollars. 
This situation was made possible by the blurred relations between the three principal actors 
that were the Government, SONEG and SEEG. The government and SONEG did not have any 
data on the account of the Saur-Vivendi consortium that fixed the price of water to their 
advantage—making SEEG the most expensive water corporation in Africa. Since then, the 
situation has not witnessed any amelioration. In Kinda, the capital town of Lower Guinea, 
situated some 135km from Conakry, the population lacked potable water for a very long time. 
The pumping station constructed by the Italian cooperation in 1975 was in a dilapidating state. 
Kania town-dwellers consumed water that was infested with, microbes (transmitting agents of 
typhoid fever). Even in the capital Conakry, many quarters till 2007 did not have potable water. 
The example of Guinea-Conakry is not unique. 
In Cote d’lvoire, the French company, Saur obtained a concession for the distribution of 
water in Abidjan in 1959, a year before this country gained independence from France. Since 
September 27, 1960, la Socièté de Distribution d’Eau de Cote d’lvoire (SODECI) replaced the 
parent company, Saur that remained the main shareholder. Confined in the capital, Abidjan and 
its environs, SODECI witnessed a boom in 1973, following the national hydraulic programme 
that was put in place by the Government. A concession contract of twenty years linked this 
company and the state. It was renewed in 1987 and was supposed to end in 2007 the failure of 
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Laurent Gbagbo to renew this contract cost his position as president and equally plunged the 
entire country into a civil war. According to the Ivorian newspaper, Le Soir Info of 17 August 
2007 which was a pro government newspaper declared that, “SODECI is offering to Cote 
d’Ivoire modern water services capable of meeting the demands of the growing population. It 
has equally africanised the management of the company” (Le Temps; 2007). However, the 
reality on the ground seemed to be different. The Ivorian press made echoes of the number of 
complaints by the population against the difficulties of water supply. 
This seems to be the case in many sub-Saharan African countries. Be it Niger, Chad, 
Senegal or Cameroon, where the management of water services as well as other social services 
is confided to foreign multinational corporations which are more preoccupied with profit 
making than satisfying the demands of the local populations. In Niger, the access of the 
population to potable water was more difficult due to high cost witnessed since the takeover of 
water management by Vivendi International. The report was the same in Chad, where the 
population was obliged to fall back to boreholes and wells as a source of potable water even in 
the capital N’djamena. In Senegal and Cameroon, the situations are not different. In Cameroon, 
for example, the population of cities like Yaoundé and Douala go for days and weeks without 
water simply because the company distributing water prefers giving water that is constantly in 
short supply, to brewing companies at the expense of the local population. 
Against this background, Boubacar Diop, member of the National council of African 
NGOs, known in French as Conseil national des ONGs Africains pour le developpement 
(CONGAD) recommended the continuous fight to constrain African leaders to abandon the 
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policy of privatizing state enterprises which is en vogues in many sub-Saharan African countries. 
He believes that water as well as electricity are instruments of national sovereignty (Soir Infi; 
2007). 
Total  
Total, is the only French company in the petroleum sector since the merger of TotalFina 
and ELF in 2000 that displayed the will of being an enterprise that is socially responsible. It 
adhered to the universal Declaration of human rights, principal convention of the International 
labour Organisation (ILO), the guiding principles of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) to the intention of  multinational corporation and many other 
international environment and safety conventions. Total was endowed with a code of conduct 
and a safety-environment and quality charter. An ethics committee was put in place in 2001 
with the principal mission to diffuse the code of conduct to workers. The system of 
environmental management was put in place with respect to the norms of ISO14001 or the 
Economic Management Audit Scheme (EMAS). Total joined the extractive industries 
transparency initiative in 2002 but failed to be part of the campaign “Publish what you pay” 
(Total; 2012). 
Despite these arrangements and commitments, Total was still subject to many 
criticisms. In matters of security, though all workers are supposed to undergo training, these 
efforts did not prevent the company from two serious accidents (one in Toulouse and the other 
in Michigan) leading to the loss of lives—10 in Toulouse and 3 in Michigan (Total; 2011). In 
issues of health, it is lamenting for a company of this magnitude (with more than 120,000 
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workers) to have just seven clinics worldwide with 22 nurses. This is insufficient when we look 
at the number of developing countries in which total operates. Lastly, in matters of 
transportation, though Total was not directly involved in the shipwreck of Erika, her 
responsibility was however implicated (Total; 2012). 
Environmental protection has been a serious preoccupation in the company ever since 
the company understood that her performance in this domain was subject to particular 
attention on the part of a large public including financial experts. Since 2000, Total has been 
publishing an annual environment and safety reports, and has created a Safety –Environment 
Quality CharterTotal; 2012). Observers (notably le Centre Francais d’information sur les 
enterprise – (CFIE) noted that the ten laws that make up the charter are vague and that 
generally, the company is preoccupied by the quality of environment in developed countries 
while it is contented by ensuring those policies tailored to the needs of developing countries 
are put in place. Since the sinking of the Erika, Total has ensured the prevention of maritime 
accidents including subjecting the chartering of vessels to more stringent rules and tighter 
internal control procedures.  
In matters of transparency, Total was severely judged by the group of NGOs that runs 
the “publish what you pay” campaign, as it is ranked 21st out of 24 oil companies noted or 
evaluated.  Total like other oil companies lead a number of sponsorship activities in Africa in 
domains such as public health, education and support to local communities (medical 
infrastructure, schools, sanitation campaigns in villages, etc) and created partnership networks 
with local association in many countries to protect nature and biodiversity. However, the 
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company remains on the fire of criticism on matters related to atmospheric emissions. In   sub 
Saharan African countries where environmental legislations are weak (notably CO2 and SO2) 
and its relation with local communities is object of severe criticism: royalties that benefit top 
ranking government officials instead of giving to the local populations and tacit support to 
dictatorial regimes in Africa. 
These are the two aspects that placed the company in a tied corner in 1999, following a 
parliamentary investigation conducted by the commission of foreign affairs at the French 
National Assembly on the role of oil companies.  In its report, the Committee pointed out that it 
was unable to obtain all the information it would have desired, especially on hot issues of 
Total's activities in Burma and Elf in Congo - Brazzaville and Chad (Loik; 2001).  By retracing the 
background of the narrow or tight relations between the state and oil companies the report laid 
emphasis on the drifts generated by this system: opaque decision making system, kickbacks, 
rebates and commissions to political parties and individuals, influence of companies on the 
French foreign policy, financing of armed groups, corruption networks, etc. 
As guarantor of petroleum procurement safety, the French Government has since the 
end of the Second World War knotted a particular relation with French petroleum companies 
established on the confusion of the general interest and their particular interest. In his book 
Affaire ELF, affaire d’État, Loik Le Floch–Prigent, former CEO of ELF sentenced for 
embezzlement, wrote:   
ELF is not just an oil company, it is a parallel diplomacy intended to have control over a 
number of African states, especially during the key moments of decolonization. It is 
equally an extension of the state so that her policy on Africa should suit the interest of 
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the country. Let us say that the CEO of ELF is at the same time the board chair (CEO) of 
an oil company and minister (bis) of cooperation. And right because this company had a 
political and diplomatic agenda in Africa that made her finance /sponsor secret services 
(Loik; 2001). 
Even if the opacity of the relation between Total and the state tend to be undermined 
by the intervention of the court that was termed by the media as “Affaire ELF”, Total still 
behaved as an invulnerable company benefitting from an uncontested legitimacy due to its 
status as the guarantor of oil supplies and delivery to France. As a matter of fact, a vigorous 
campaign was carried out against ELF and its role in “Francafrique”. In reaction, the company 
attacked the NGOs and took them to court not because of the accusation labeled against the 
company, but for misusing its corporate logo ( Joly & Beccaria; 2004). 
Militants of the centre d’étude et d’initiative de solidarité international (CEDETIM) and 
the leader of the Green Party, Noel Mamere had  symbolically bought shares at ELF that 
permitted them take  part in the general assembly of shareholders where they were booed, yet 
succeeded to express worries about the practice of the company. This campaign brought 
together NGOs and ELF trade unions. 
In the 5th edition of its corporate report of 2006 on society and environment, “Sharing 
our energy” (Total; 2012), the chair of the Board of directors, Thierry Demarest declared that, 
“Total can use the result already obtained and the ameliorations in process in the different 
domains covered by its corporate social responsibility” (Ibid). In the course of perusing the 92 
page document, we saw a list of corporate issue sponsored by the company in favour of the 
environment and local populations. Citing Angola for example, where Total has been exploiting 
the oil fields of Dalia since 2006, with a prospective production of 240000 barrels per day, Total 
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was involved in community development in consultation with the government and local 
institutions. In collaboration with Angolan NGOs such as Agrisud and Okutiuka, Total sponsored 
agricultural projects in the vicinities of Luanda and in some national reconstruction zones. 
However, the report did not mention the reason for such reconstructions. This is due to the 
long civil war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that has ravaged the country since 
independence in 1975 and the death of the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in  February 2002, 
orchestrating the death of some 1.5 million Angolans( Capron; 2004). 
During this period, ELF sponsored the two camps as it did in Congo – Brazzaville in 1996. 
The staunch man of Loik Le Floche-Prigent, Alfred Sirven offered 20 million US dollars to the 
UNITA of Jonas Savimbi during the 1992 elections. The kickbacks paid by ELF to the belligerents 
permitted them to buy arms that destroyed the country that is today under reconstruction 
(Ryfman; 2007).  
Rougier Activities in the Equatorial Forest 
The two major French companies operating in the timber sector in the Equatorial forest 
are Rougier and Pasquest. In the first half of 2007, Rougier announced a total net profit of 7.9 
million Euros representing 131% in relation to the first semester of 2006 (Awang; 2012). In its 
report, the company signaled the operation of a new mill site at Merang in Gabon that came to 
add to its implantation in Congo Brazzaville and Cameroon (Labrousse & Vershave; 2002). On 
her part the Pasquet Holding announced a net profit of 535,000 Euros for 2005 for a turnover of 
2,138 million Euros.  
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The forest of the Congo Basin exclusively belongs to states that are implementing a 
system of concessions to exploit their natural resources. This scheme was directly inherited at 
the beginning of the 20th century when colonial powers exploited the vast massive of the 
African forest by granting operating rights to private companies from the metropoles. Till the 
1990s, the attribution of forest exploitation permits was done through mutual agreements 
following well-established clientele logic. During this period territorial taxes were very low or 
non-existent. We should not forget that a large number of exploitation rights were allocated 
during the period of conflict that prevailed in the region in exchange for weapons to various 
belligerents.  
Due to pressure from environmental advocacy organisations, the international financial 
institutions have put in place a number of reforms. The Forest Code imposed by the World Bank 
in 2002, stipulates that 40% of the forestry tax should be redistributed to local authorities for 
the realization of basic infrastructure of community interest. It should be recalled that the 
countries of Central African Sub region are refusing to ratify  Convention 169 of the ILO, that 
affirms that property and possession right on land that is traditionally occupied should be 
attributed to the indigenous people concerned. It is therefore not surprising that the proceeds 
from this tax known as annual forestry tax do not profit the local populations concerned. 
Besides, it is open secret that many of the companies operating in this sector are always looking 
for means to swindle these taxes through transfer pricing. A list from the Ministry of Finance in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, dated 2005, reveals that 45% of forest taxes for the previous 
years were not paid by timber companies. The example of Yokadouma, a town in the East 
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Region of Cameroon, near the borders with the Central African Republic is very explicit(Awang; 
2012). 
The annual budget of the Yokadonma Municipal Council is about 1.6 million Euros. 
Yokadonma is the richest town after Yaoundé, the political capital of Cameroon. Yet, the 
inhabitants of Yokadonma are still living in squalor. They lack basic infrastructures like roads, 
electricity and pipe borne water. Misery is still very glaring in this part of the country that 
produces the highest quality of timber that is exploited and exported by foreign companies. 
Cameroon is often cited as the pioneer country as far as progress in forest exploitation is 
concerned (Karsenty; 2006). Since 1994, the Cameroonian legislation allows local people to 
exercise their usufruct right over the land they traditionally occupy by asking for the allocation 
of a community forest. The trees should be felled by hand and in a sustainable manner. Yet, this 
country plagued by corruption according to the report of Transparency International and the 
association survie, trees are continuously cut down in defiance of any environmental law and 
respect for local populations(Ibid). 
The same story holds with Moabi, a sacred and nourishing tree for the Baka Pygmies, an 
indigenous people in the East Region of Cameroon. The oil extracted from the moabi is used as 
cooking oil and body lotion as well. But the moabi is regenerating poorly since this tree only 
matures at from 50 years and produces fruits only once every three years. When villagers with 
a weak retribution compared to the price of timber, dare fell such a tree, they risk a fine or 
imprisonment. Conversely, timber companies to whom these forests are conceded have no 
reason to fear because they have the means to dribble the laws in force for such a crime. The 
64 International Journal of Knowledge and Innovation in Business (IJKIB) 
December 2014, Vol.2, No.1, pp.39-77 
 
website of Rougier presented a form on moabi indicating that it is a hardwood, red- brown – 
pink, with a good natural durability and can be used to build stairs and furniture for external 
coating. The website indicated that this wood is found in Gabon and Cameroon, but fails to talk 
about the Baka pygmies and the effect of deforestation on these populations. Another big 
French company that operates in this sector is Pallisco.  Present in Cameroon since 1977, 
Pallisco equally exploits the moabi (Awang; 2012). 
French heads of states have made themselves ardent defenders of the forest and they 
proclaim this by speaking up whenever they find themselves in Africa. For instance in February 
5, 2005, President Jacques Chirac, in a speech during the opening ceremony of the 2nd summit 
of African Heads of states and governments on the conservation of forest ecosystems in Central 
Africa, was aware of the urgency of the problem: “The protection of the forest cannot wait. It 
has to lean on concrete realization that will conciliate the conservation of the most remarkable 
space and sustainable exploitation of timber”. President Nicolas Sarkozy, during his maiden trip 
to Africa following his election in 2007, visited the Mondah Forest with his host, President Omar 
Bongo to show the importance he attached to the problem. During a press conference of 27 
July 2007, he declared that: 
Gabon is an important extraordinary reserve for the planet; Gabon as part of the Congo 
Basin has the second biggest forest in the world after the Amazonian forest. That 
represents a potential assumption of greenhouse gas. Gabon alone consumes annually 
four times the quantity the greenhouse gas produced by France. It is therefore our 
responsibility to help our Gabonese friends to maintain, sustainably and exploit this 
forest which is a resource for the entire globe. The most important raw material for 
Africa in any opinion is the forest. We should not allow this forest to be plundered. We 
have to keep it (Sarkozy; 2007). 
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President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that he was proposing to transform 50 million 
Euros of debt by investing in the Gabonese forest. He went further to add that: “It is my wish 
that European countries should be more severe with illegal suppliers of timber since I do not 
want the African forests to be plundered. It has to be respected because it is an essential 
element for global balance” (Ibid). However the gap between this eloquent rhetoric and the 
reality is more complex. This paradox of the situation obliged the World Wide Fund for Nature 
to declare that: 
In effect, the volume of timber supplied to France through illegal channels is very 
important: 47% of timber is illegally exploited in Brazil, 73% in Indonesia, 50% in 
Cameroon. None of the great basins that produce tropical timber is exempted. These 
figures are certainly below the actual flow of tropical timber in France (Awang; 2012). 
Particularly active in France on the theme of deforestation, Friends of the Earth, France, 
in 2005 initiated a campaign dubbed “Moabi: tree of life or profit” to educate companies and 
consumers on forest conservation.  In May 2006, it congratulated Saint Maclou that had 
announced it will no longer commercialise Moabi (Friends of the Earth; 2012). Before then, in 
March 2002, Friends of the Earth filed a complaint with seven Cameroonian farmers against la 
Societe de Droit Cameroonians (SFID) and its parent company, La Societe Rougier S.A under 
Cameroonian law for the destruction of private property belonging to others, forgery, fraud, 
concealment and corruption of its workers. The objective was to denounce acts of corruption in 
the Cameroon subsidiary within the context of importing illegal timber. However, this 
complaint was rejected and thrown out of the court room by the Appeal Court of Paris on 
February 13, 2004. Other NGOs equally reacted on the question with different methods. This 
was the case with Greenpeace whose 13 militants in July 4, 2007, climbed on a crane at La 
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Rochelle-Pallice to prevent the offloading of timber imported from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. On August 29, 2007, Greenpeace asked France, the day after Nicolas Sarkozy visited 
Mondah forest in Gabon to ask the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to stop sponsoring 
OLAM International, a Singapore based company that is highly implicated in the illegal trade of 
timber” (OLAM; 2012). WWF equally carried out a vast campaign in 2006 titled. “I say no to 
illegal timber” (Friends of the Earth; 2012). It screened the timber that was imported in France 
to make sure it was certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
Rougier equally enhanced the collaboration with local and NGOs on its website: 
Memorandum of understanding between wildlife conservation society- Gabon and Rougier -
Gabon on May 16, 2003 Memorandum of understanding with WWF-Gabon, logistic support to 
Cooperation Action san Frontiers (CASF) in Cameroon, etc. All these initiatives are mostly 
centred on the preservation of the forest and wildlife (Rougier; 2012).  
Companies have integrated the aspiration of consumers and try to respond to them by 
enhancing susceptible action to convince the consumers that the companies are putting 
everything in place to satisfy their clients. It has been noticed that practices such as corruption 
are difficult to control on the field because they are not always commensurate to green 
speeches made by the chief executives officers (CEOs) of these companies. However, they 
equally have a responsibility to satisfy the huge appetites of their shareholders who, 
notwithstanding the exigencies on environmental protection are constantly finding out if their 
money is yielding dividends. Today, eco-certification, as another device of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), has become a market with drifts. This is what happened in Cameroon 
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where Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) withdrew from a French company, Eurocertifor (an 
affiliate of Bureau Veritas Quality International /BVQI), the right to deliver its seal of 
environmental good conduct to timber companies found in Cameroon on February 8, 2005 
(Dirk & Moon; 2005). This decision was taken because of the controversy surrounding this 
award. In December 2005, following the audit carried out by Eurocertifor for the FSC 
certification to Wijma, a Dutch company, for a permit of 36000 hectares situated in the South 
West Region of Cameroon. Environmental protection based NGOs (Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, as well as local NGOs such as centre pour l’environnement et le development) stood up 
against the award of this environmental good conduct, the first ever delivered in Africa, saying 
that the company did not meet certain criteria, particularly with regard to the ban on poaching, 
boundary plots cut or welfare of employees. Their criticisms obliged FSC to conduct an audit in 
June 2006 that equally concluded that Wijma “did not meet all the requirements demanded by 
the certification” (Ibid). 
Activities of Bollore in Cameroon 
The Bolloré Group is currently one of the world’s top 500 companies, with an annual 
turnover of more than seven billion Euros. Its global expansion has been largely concentrated in 
Africa, where it now operates in 43 countries. Vincent Bolloré – the 18th wealthiest man in 
France in 2009 – has built an empire with far more extensive outreach than the former French 
colonies (Thomas; 2009, 32). He has gained control of not only plantations and public services 
throughout Africa, but also controls a large portion of the shipping and transport industry and 
the continent’s ports (historically the group’s main business activity in Africa), and its oil 
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industry. His control of strategic and lucrative sectors provide him with the financial capital 
needed to back his stock market dealings and expansionist strategy (Ibid) for the purpose of 
this study, we are going to dwell on the plantation activities of the Bollore Group in Cameroon 
Through a complex structure of subsidiaries, the Bolloré Group’s Socfin (Société 
Financière des Caoutchoucs) operates rubber and oil palm plantations in Cameroon, DR Congo, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Socfin claims that it is 
committed to the principles and criteria of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
These include transparency, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, responsible 
consideration of employees, individuals and communities, environmental responsibility, and 
conservation of natural resources and biodiversity (Sherpa; 2010). Yet the reality on the ground, 
in Cameroon as in other countries, contradicts this commitment.  
In recent years, Socfin and Bolloré Group’s notoriety for wrongdoing around the world 
has grown. Investment malpractices have been reported from several countries including 
Cameroon, Cambodia, and Liberia, resulting in discontent among local populations. In 
December 2010, a group of NGOs (Sherpa, CED, FOCARFE, and MISEREOR) filed a complaint 
with OECD against a Socfin subsidiary, the Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies (SOCAPALM), 
which operates five oil palm plantations in Cameroon. The company was accused of negatively 
impacting the traditional livelihoods of local communities and plantation workers, as well as for 
water and air pollution (Sherpa et al; 2012). 
The expansion of SOCAPALM’s operations has allegedly diminished the size and the 
availability of public services and natural resources for local communities. Moreover, local 
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villagers have reported physical abuse by SOCAPALM’s security services, Africa Security. The 
complainants also allege that SOCAPALM’s treatment of plantation workers constitutes a 
breach of the OECD guidelines. Precarious work is rampant, and freedom of association is 
limited. Additionally, the housing facilities are deplorable, and dividends promised to 
employees, when SOCAPALM was privatized in 2000, were never paid. The complaint also 
claims that SOCAPALM has breached the guidelines disclosure chapter by failing to properly 
disclose relevant information about the company and potential environmental risks (Ibid). 
The French, Belgian, and Luxembourgian holding companies Bolloré, Financière du 
champ de Mars, SOCFIN, and Intercultures exert joint control over SOCAPALM’s operations in 
Cameroon through complex financial investments. The complainants allege that these 
companies have breached the OECD guidelines as well by failing to take action to prevent 
SOCAPALM’s negative impact on the environment, local communities, and workers (Ibid). 
In 2010, the World Rainforest Movement (WRM) reported that SOCAPALM was 
expanding its operations without regard for neighboring ecosystems, thus seriously 
endangering the food security of local populations. WRM warned about the pollution caused by 
the agrochemical products used on the monoculture plantations and the waste effluents 
discharged by a factory in Kienké, drastically contaminating the area’s waterways. WRM also 
reported abominable living and working conditions on the plantations: insalubrious living 
quarters and shared latrines; lack of regular access to water and electricity; and mostly 
temporary employment at miserable wages with no social security coverage or adequate 
protection.(World Rainforest Movement; 2010). This situation led to numerous strikes and 
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protests. In 2007, when a resistance movement against these labor practices emerged, its 
leader was immediately arrested, and the authorities let him know that “if he kept it up he was 
going to get killed” (Ibid). 
Bolloré Africa Logistics controls over 13 African ports, including a 20-year concession of 
the port of Freetown, secured in December 2010 and Conakry in neighboring Guinea, gained in 
March 2011. This follows an aggressive expansion strategy of the Group, which is seeking to 
gain a monopoly in this sector. As stated by Bolloré: “we are interested by all African 
ports.”(Eburnienews; 2011) In Africa, the Group is a leader in stevedoring and runs several 
national railways in Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Malawi, Botswana, South Africa and Madagascar. The Group is a quasi-monopoly for the 
transport of the Europe-Africa trade (except Southern Africa where it competes with the Danish 
Maersk Lines) (Ibid). 
Through complex financial and institutional set-ups, involving different companies with 
different names and structures, the Bolloré Group is involved in a number of agricultural 
investments, which, as in Cameroon, involve a litany of malpractices, dispossession, and loss of 
livelihoods for thousands of people in Asia and Africa. By expanding its presence in both 
production and transport, the Bolloré Group is developing a model of integration, one that 
covers a range of activities geared toward the extraction of natural resources from developing 
countries, particularly in Africa. The Group is increasingly reaching a situation of monopoly or 
quasi-monopoly over critical economic sectors. Such a hold on power carries major risks for 
local populations and governments who are progressively losing control not only over their 
K. Awang Ollong 
“The Paradox of Corporate Social Responsibility in Africa: Case of French Multinational Corporations” 
71 
 
production but also trade flows in and out of the country. Disempowering people and 
governments, such an expansion strategy, clearly contradicts the Group’s stated commitment 
to sustainable development (SOCFIN; 2012).       
Way Forward for CSR by MNCs in Africa 
This paper suggests that global firms should spread their standards outside their 
corporate boundaries, either unwittingly, by setting examples for local competitors, or by 
evangelism of suppliers and partners. Ironically, then, globalization is accompanied both by a 
race for lowest production costs and increasing demands for corporate social responsibility. In 
sum, pressures for global convergence of CSR standards are strong, but the paths by which this 
process proceeds are neither linear nor smooth.  
Corporate social responsibility can also be seen as an attempt by corporations to 
enhance their legitimacy in the face of critics who bemoan the extent to which the modern 
corporation seems unconnected to the communities in which it operates, responding only to 
market pressures and profit seeking. Processes of globalization have made this criticism seem 
even more persuasive. The economic recession and crisis of trust that followed the speculative 
boom since 2007 seems to have had a greater effect on the developed economies than on the 
rapidly developing economies and those countries on the periphery of the global economy. It is 
clear that the recession has delegitimized much of the financial sector of advanced capitalist 
nations and, at the same time, raised questions about the adequacy of the regulatory systems 
of those countries. Moreover, it is not just financial firms that require re-legitimation: in the US, 
non-financial firms’ profits recovered to record levels within a year after the formal end of the 
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recession, while their employment rolls remained stagnant or even declined, and large 
employers engaged in widespread reductions in the “corporate safety net,” cutting health 
benefits for retirees and retrenching their pension programs for current employees. At a 
minimum we should expect the search for legitimacy to increase the attempts of corporations 
to present themselves as socially responsible. In many cases, we expect corporations to 
increase their commitment to programmes and standards associated with CSR claims.  
At first glance it might appear awkward to expect that Multinational Companies (MNCs) 
meet a goal other than what they are created for; which is to maximise profit. Some have thus 
spent time justifying why such companies should ever pursue a sustainable development 
approach. Be that as it may, multinational companies in general and French companies in 
particular find themselves cornered between the obsolescing bargaining power of the 
government and the relentless demands of the indigenous community. 
It is of paramount importance to note that becoming a global citizen should be a goal 
advanced by all those engaged in the business of natural resource exploration and exploitation. 
They should, for instance, abstain from any act of corruption and should be vigilant of 
environment concerns. The lower standards of safety, health, and general working conditions 
applied by some companies, notably French, has only increased the bitterness.  Certainly, it is 
justifiable to accuse the companies of being a complicit for the oppression and human right 
abuse that unfolds in areas like Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, the Niger Delta and 
Darfur. 
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Conclusion 
It is the general belief that extractive, forestry, water management and plantation 
agriculture industries are the vehicles for the alleviation of poverty and general sustainable 
development of the poorer developing countries or LDCs, especially in Africa.69 If these sectors 
are to achieve this feat, then the multinational corporations which are a part of these 
industries, will need to abide by international labour, environmental and human rights norms 
and standards, and codes of conduct. 
In reality this is not the case, as can be seen from the multiplicity of labour, 
environmental and human rights abuses and violations committed directly or otherwise by 
some French multinational corporations in the course of their economic activities. In a 
continent like Africa with weak regulatory framework and non-implementation of law, 
corporations are often tempted to adapt to the social and political situation of the surroundings 
in which they have operations. This for African resource-rich countries means a myriad of social 
problems, top of which is an invasion of their labour, environmental and human rights. 
Multinational corporations are not immune to these problems as they also are imminently 
affected by disgruntled citizens who disrupt their operations, leading to a loss of earnings. 
In order to avoid this situation, the international human rights arena cannot rely on only 
the mostly voluntary codes that apply to MNCs, nor can they hope to make multinational 
corporations accountable through only legal enforcement mechanisms which have been shown 
not to be water-tight in enforcing human rights protection of Africans in light of the 
aforementioned peculiarities of the continent. All stake-holders in economic sector, i.e. host 
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and home states of MNCs, including the MNCs and the international arena and international 
institutions, including multilateral agencies all have a part to play. 
The question on the effectiveness of the labour, environmental and human rights 
enforcement mechanisms in Africa has already been partially answered; going forward these 
mechanisms need to be strengthened to give better effect to their application. Furthermore, 
other mechanisms such as equator lending principles by multilateral agencies, “naming and 
shaming” processes, complaint procedures, transparency initiatives, and other voluntary 
initiatives need to go hand-in-glove with the legal enforcement mechanisms to strengthen 
pressure against MNCs so that they can adhere to their corporate social responsibility, and 
thereby make the possibility of economic development in Africa, while yet promoting and 
protecting the rights of the citizenry.
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